


A Low-Cost Memory Remapping Scheme for Address Bus Protection

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Security Breaches --- from another way around

- ❖ Steal Secret
- ❖ Alter Execution




2

Outline

- ❖ Background & Motivation
 - Secure Processor Model
 - Address Information Leakage
- ❖ Previous Address Bus Protection Solutions
 - The HIDE Scheme
 - The Shuffle Scheme
- ❖ Our Low-Cost Address Permutation Scheme
- ❖ Performance Evaluation
- ❖ Conclusion

3

Secure Processor Model




[D. Lie et al. ASPLOS 2000, G. Edward Suh et al. MICRO 36, J. Yang et al. MICRO 36]

4

Address Information Leakage

[X. Zhuang, ASPLOS 2004]



Address Sequence	abc abc abc ...	abcd abd abcd abd ...
CFG Hint	Loop	Conditional Branch

5

Oblivious Memory Access

- ❖ The idea: [Oded Goldreich et al.]
 - Replace each memory access by a sequence of redundant accesses
 - Satisfactory from a theoretical perspective
- ❖ Overhead:

	"naive"	"square root"	"hierarchical"
Memory	m	$m + 2\sqrt{m}$	$O(t \cdot \log^2 t)$
Runtime	$t \cdot m$	$O(t \cdot \sqrt{m})$	$O(t \cdot \log^3 t)$


6

The HIDE Cache

- ❖ The Idea: break the correlation between repeated addresses [Xiaotong Zhuang et al. ASPLOS 2004]
 - Permute the address space at suitable intervals
 - Permute blocks within a "chunk"
- ❖ How: Lock and Permute
 - Lock a block in the cache
 - A new read from memory
 - A dirty block since last permutation
 - Permute a chunk when replacing a locked block


7

HIDE Cache: An Example



8


Increased Memory Accesses



Breakdown of memory traffic for different chunk sizes


9

Increased Memory Accesses



Histogram of pages with 0-128 blocks accessed between permutations

Redundant Permutations




11

The Shuffle Buffer

- ❖ The Idea: dynamic control flow obfuscation [X. Zhuang et al., CASES 2004]
 - Relocate a block if they appeared on the bus once
- ❖ How: Random Swap
 - Any newly read block is inserted into a shuffle buffer
 - A buffered block is written back to the address of the newly read block
 - Only read/write access pairs are observed on the address bus


12

Shuffle Buffer: An Example



13

Increased Page Faults



14

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
15

Our Scheme

- ❖ Goals:
 - Avoid wasteful memory traffic
 - Eliminate wasteful permutations
 - Avoid wasteful reads/writes in each permutation
 - Preserve locality and keep the page fault rate low
- ❖ How: RR Block Permutation
 - Permute only on-chip blocks of the same chunk
 - Permute only when an RR (Recently Read) block is to be replaced

16

RR Block Permutation Overview




17

RR Block Permutation: An Example

Events	(1) Initially	(2) load x,y,z from memory	(3) read miss replace x	(4) permutation	(5) write hit	(6) read miss replace y
Cache	[][][]	[x][y][z]	[x][y][z]	[x][y][z]	[z][y][x]	[z][y][x]
Mem	$m[a_1]=x$ $m[a_2]=y$ $m[a_3]=z$		Only x is written back	$m[b_1]=x$ $m[b_2]=y$ $m[b_3]=z$	Only y is written back	$m[b_1]=x$ $m[b_2]=y$ $m[b_3]=z$

18


Comparison of Number of Permutations



19


The Search Algorithm

--- Permute Sufficient Number of Blocks



20

How Many Pages to be Searched?




21

Security Strength

- ❖ Between two permutations, all addresses on the bus are different
- ❖ The easiest case: A block being mapped to the n^{th} writeback $\rightarrow (1 - \frac{1}{128})^{n-1} \times \frac{1}{128}$
- ❖ It becomes more difficult to make a correct guess with these uncertainties:
 - No clear indication when a permutation happens
 - No fixed set of on-chip blocks that participate in a permutation

22

The Permutation Unit



23

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
24

Experiment Environment

- ❖ Tools
 - Simplescalar Toolset 3.0
 - SPEC2K benchmarks
- ❖ Configuration
 - Cache
 - Separate L1 I- and D-cache: 8K, 32B line
 - Integrated L2 Cache: 1M, 32B line
 - Chunk Size: 8K, 16K, 32K, 64K
 - Other Settings
 - Page Settings: 4KB, perfect LRU repl policy
 - Perfect auxiliary on-chip storage for all schemes


25

Memory Traffic Comparison



26

Page Faults Comparison



27

Conclusion

- ❖ Proposed an efficient address permutation scheme to combat the information leakage on the address bus
- ❖ Tackled two main problems of the previous schemes:
 - The excessive memory traffic in the HIDE scheme
 - The increased page faults in the Shuffle scheme
- ❖ Preliminary experiments:
 - Reduce the memory traffic in HIDE from 12X to 1.88X
 - Keep the page fault rate as low as the base settings

28

Thanks

Questions ?



29